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Abstract 
Through an empirical study of working time in the United Kingdom, we explore 
the scope for initiatives based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) to engender 
voluntary action by employers to raise labour standards.  Our evidence suggests 
that a CSR-based approach faces considerable problems of implementation in this 
area, in large part because the legal mechanisms which might underpin CSR 
(‘reflexive law’) have not yet been effectively developed. 
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Reflexive Law, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Evolution of Labour 
Standards: the Case of Working Time 
 
 
‘Management invariably claims the right to decide when overtime is necessary; but 
this right carries with it the obligation not to squander human resources.  The facts 
indicate that in much of British industry this obligation is largely unrecognized.’ 





The aim of this paper is examine certain claims made in connection with the theory 
of ‘reflexive law’, using an empirical case study based on the regulation of 
working time.  We show that the theory of reflexive law can be adapted to argue in 
favour of a model of regulatory competition which seeks to preserve diversity and 
experimentation at local level, a model which has much in common with the 
concept of the open method of coordination. As an example of this, Directive 
93/104/EC on Working Time can be understood by reference to the idea that self-
regulation by the social partners and other actors in civil society is preferable to the 
imposition of uniform regulatory solutions.  An analysis of European-level 
discourse on working time highlights the links which have developed between the 
Directive and the development of OMC via the employment strategy and, more 
recently, the beginnings of a debate about corporate social responsibility as a 
mechanism for the implementation of labour standards.   
 
However, when we go on to contrast this high-level discourse with an empirical 
study of the operation of the Directive in the UK, a much less optimistic picture 
emerges.  We can see that the Directive is at risk of degenerating into a weak and 
partial mechanism for the realization of social rights.   The appropriate institutional 
mechanisms are not yet in place to enable the policy goals of the Directive to be 
implemented at a local level in the UK; in particular, the regulatory environment is 
not conducive to the kinds of collective reflexion and learning which this strategy 
requires.  To that extent, our study highlights the potential obstacles to wider 
reliance on reflexive forms of governance. 
 
To address these issues, we begin, in section 2 below, by outlining the concept of 
reflexive law, relating it to the open method of coordination and exploring the   2
relevance, in this context, of corporate social responsibility.  In section 3 we look 
at the evolution of labour standards governing working time in the UK, charting 
the successive phases of factory legislation and collective bargaining up to the 
point of the implementation of the Working Time Directive.  We then provide an 
overview of the Directive, its policy goals, and the highlighting, within policy 
documents, of ‘reflexive’ strategies for its application through collective (and 
individual) bargaining and CSR.  In sections 4 and 5 we present our empirical 
study, which examines how far this strategy has succeeded in practice.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Basic concepts: working time, reflexive law, and the open method of 
coordination 
 
The concept of reflexive law is, at one and the same time, a positive or descriptive 
theory, and a normative one.  In its positive sense, it aims to explain the 
mechanisms through which the legal system relates to other sub-systems, such as 
the economy or, more specifically, the industrial relations system.  As Ralf 
Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen (1994: 7) suggest, ‘[r]eflexive law reminds legal 
intervention that it is dependent on self-regulation within the regulated systems… a 
sophisticated labour law approach tries to “regulate” not only through 
“performance” but also through influencing centres of “reflexion” within other 
social subsystems’.  In its normative sense, it not only offers guidance on the 
appropriate form of legal regulation in a complex and uncertain environment; it 
can be seen as promoting a multi-level approach to governance which depends, for 
its effectiveness, on de-centralised forms of deliberation (Smismans, 2004).  As 
two of us have suggested elsewhere, with reflexive law 
 
‘the preferred mode of intervention is for the law to underpin and encourage 
autonomous processes of adjustment, in particular by supporting mechanisms 
of group representation and participation, rather than to intervene by imposing 
particular distributive outcomes.  This type of approach finds a concrete 
manifestation in legislation which seeks, in various ways, to devolve or confer 
rule-making powers to self-regulatory processes.  Examples are laws which 
allow collective bargaining by trade unions and employers to make qualified 
exceptions to limits on working time or similar labour standards’ (Barnard 
and Deakin, 2002: 219-220; see also Deakin, 1999). 
   3
The implementation in the UK of the EU Working Time Directive
1 therefore 
provides an opportunity to study the operation, in practice, of legislation which 
incorporates these ‘reflexive’ goals.  Prior to the implementation of the Directive, 
regulation of working time in the UK had taken two forms: statutory regulation of 
hours of a traditional kind, dating back, indeed, to the very earliest forms of factory 
legislation in the period of the industrial revolution; and voluntary collective 
bargaining, carried out at national or sectoral level between trade unions and 
employers’ associations, with a further layer of regulation operating through plant-
level agreements.  Strikingly, factory legislation and collective bargaining were 
conceived of as alternatives; statutory controls only applied in the absence of self-
regulation.  The Working Time Directive radically changed the picture.  Now, 
legislation set for the first time for the UK a near-comprehensive set of working 
time limits, the centerpiece of which was the maximum 48-hour working week.  
However, many of these limits took the form of default rules which could be 
avoided by derogations of various kinds.  Among other routes, it was now possible 
for collective agreements to derogate from or otherwise vary the standards set by 
statute.  Although this had long been a feature of continental European systems of 
regulation, it was novel for the UK.   
 
The particular regulatory form of the Directive was the result, in part, of political 
concessions granted, during its negotiation, to the UK and other member states.  
However, it also reflected, in a more positive light, the multiplicity of objectives 
set for the Directive: motivated primarily by health and safety concerns (and 
formally justified on these grounds in terms of the competence of the Community 
legislator), it could also be presented as a mechanism for improving productivity, 
on the grounds that reduced hours of work could provide an incentive for the more 
efficient utilisation of labour.   In this respect, a crucial aspect of the Directive was 
the flexibility which it appeared to offer to employers and unions to craft local-
level solutions to deal with the trade-offs involved in negotiating working time 
settlements. In that sense, the Working Time Directive provides an example of 
‘reflexive harmonization’: 
 
‘Reflexive harmonization operates to induce individual states to enter into a 
“race to the top” when they would have otherwise had an incentive to do 
nothing (the “reverse free rider effect”) or to compete on the basis of the 
withdrawal of protective standards (the “race to the bottom”).  This is done by 
giving states a number of options for implementation as well as by allowing 
for the possibility that existing, self-regulatory mechanisms can be used to   4
comply with EU-wide standards.  In these ways, far from suppressing 
regulatory innovation, harmonization aims to stimulate it’ (Barnard and 
Deakin, 2002: 220. 
 
This type of regulation has much in common with the mode of governance which 
has become known as the open method of coordination or OMC.  In its various 
manifestations including the Employment Strategy, the OMC involves a number of 
mechanisms which provide for experimentation and learning:  
 
‘fixing guidelines for the Union, establishing quantitative and qualititative 
indicators and benchmarks as a means of comparing best practice, translating 
these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting 
specific targets, and periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review 
organized as “mutual learning processes”’.
2 
 
The term ‘reflexive law’ anticipates OMC by a number of years, as do the legal 
measures to which, at a European level, it relates, in particular the so-called third 
and fourth generation of Directives in the areas of consumer protection and labour 
market regulation, which date from the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Armstrong 
and Bulmer, 1998; Deakin, 2001).  However, there is a case for regarding these 
provisions, of which the Working Time Directive is one, as prototypes for what 
later became the OMC.  The norms contained in framework directives are often 
sufficiently loose for them to take on the quality of ‘benchmarks’ and ‘targets’, to 
be implemented in varying ways according to local conditions.  It is true that the 
norms contained in even these Directives have a ‘hard law’ aspect which is 
missing, for example, from the guidelines laid down in the Employment Strategy.  
However, it is plain here that we are talking about a spectrum of different forms, 
which exhibit combinations of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law in varying degrees. 
 
A crucial aspect of reflexive law is that it involves not simply an attempt to 
delegate rule making authority to self-regulatory mechanisms such as collective 
bargaining, but also an effort to use legal norms, procedures and sanctions to 
‘frame’ or ‘steer’ the process of self-regulation; to that extent, the implementation 
of the frame is a matter of institutional construction, and is not left entirely to 
spontaneous forces (De Schutter, 2004).  In the case of the Working Time 
Directive, the frame is provided by a number of elements: these include the basic 
standards set in the default rules themselves (such as the rules on the maximum 
working week, or the maximum duration of night work), and the procedural   5
conditions attaching to derogation (such as the requirements for agreement to be 
made either with a certain collective party, such as a recognized trade union, or 
employee representatives capable of concluding a workforce agreement).  Further 
framing is provided by the recognition that working time protections can qualify as 
fundamental social rights: this is provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, which was applied by the ECJ in ex parte Bectu
3 in such a 
way as to clarify the meaning of the Directive.    
 
The question nevertheless remains of whether ‘framing’ of this kind is sufficient.  
The implementation of the Directive in the UK occurred at a time when the 
previously dominant form of regulation of working time, operating through 
sectoral collective agreements, was in steep decline.  Are the new, multi-layered 
forms of reflexive regulation truly an effective substitute for the organic solidarity 
offered by collective bargaining? 
 
The success of a reflexive law strategy depends on its capacity to engender 
responses of a certain kind within the relevant sub-systems.   In the context of 
working time, two particular types of responses are relevant.  One set operates at 
the level of the industrial relations system: we refer here to the various 
mechanisms (collective, ‘workforce’ and individual agreements) by which 
derogations from the default rules set by the Directive are allowed. How effective, 
in practice, are these self-regulatory devices in promoting the regulatory goals of 
the Directive?  A second set of mechanisms operates at the level of the enterprise 
and the competitive pressures acting upon it through labour, product and capital 
markets.  Here, the notion of corporate social responsibility or CSR comes into 
play: enterprises can, it is argued, combine respect for labour standards with 
enhanced competitiveness by trading off reduced working hours in return for 
higher productivity.  Again, the question is posed of how far the Directive and its 
implementing Regulations do enough to induce this kind of response from firms. 
   6
3.  The evolution of working time regulation: from the Factory Acts to 
corporate social responsibility 
 
3.1 Working time as a ‘traditional’ labour standard: the Factory Act model 
and collective bargaining 
 
The earliest Factory Acts had been concerned with the conditions of employment 
and working hours of children, and specifically with those of pauper apprentices. 
As early as 1784 the Manchester magistrates passed a resolution to prohibit 
indentures of parish apprentices to cotton masters under terms which could require 
them to work at night or for more than ten hours in the day. An Act of 1793 gave 
the justices power to fine employers for mistreatment of apprentices, and in 1802 
the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act set a statutory 12 hour day and 
prohibited nightwork for parish apprentices employed in mills and factories. The 
measure was ‘in reality not a Factory Act properly speaking, but merely an 
extension of the Elizabethan Poor Law relating to parish apprentices’ (Hutchins 
and Harrison, 1926: 16).  A series of Acts between 1819 and 1833 then achieved in 
gradual stages the exclusion of all children under the age of 9 from factory 
employment; a maximum 9-hour working day and 48-hour week for the under-13s; 
a 12-hour working day and 69-hour week for those between 13 and 18; and the 
abolition of nightwork for all under 18, although these regulations applied only to 
textile mills.  
 
The working conditions of women were first the subject of regulation in the early 
1840s. The Mines Regulation Act of 1842 barred women from underground 
working and the Factories Act of 1844 applied to women textile workers the 
restrictions on working hours which governed the employment of the under-18s. 
The fact that early industrial regulation took a legislative rather than a voluntary 
form reflects the weakness of the factory-based unions during the period prior to 
1870 and their inability to achieve agreements through collective bargaining; at the 
same time, the legislature was reluctant to countenance general interference with 
the freedom of contract of adult males, rejecting a number of Bills to this effect in 
the 1850s. Male workers indirectly benefited from the controls over the hours of 
women and children because the working hours of each group were closely 
integrated; when employers attempted to defeat this effect through the ‘relay 
system’, under which the hours children were permitted to work were spread over 
a number of separate ‘relays’ across the different shifts worked by adults, 
Parliament enacted further legislation in 1850 and 1853 to counter this by requiring   7
common starting and finishing times for all workers in a given factory. However, it 
stopped short of extending the Acts to cover all adult males. Instead, the pattern of 
regulation in textiles was gradually extended to cover printing, dyeing and 
bleaching and lace working. The Factories Acts Extension Act of 1867 applied the 
same principles to all factories of fifty or more employees, and the Workshops 
Regulation Act of the same year restricted hours of work in smaller manufacturing 
establishments, although allowing for longer operating hours. Again, these 
regulations only applied to women and the young. The 1867 Extension Act 
governed iron foundries and works manufacturing glass and metals, but very few 
women and children worked in such establishments and so the restraint on their 
hours did not affect the working hours of men. 
 
After the 1870s, however, the flow of legislation began to dry up. In 1873 a Bill 
was introduced to establish a 9-hour day and 54-hour week for women and young 
workers in factories, but this was rejected in favour of a more limited measure was 
passed in 1874 reducing maximum weekly hours in textiles to only 55.5. By the 
early 1900s collective bargaining was already beginning to improve upon the hours 
set by legislation, and women workers covered by the Factories Acts frequently 
worked longer hours than male workers who had the protection of shop floor or 
sector-level agreements setting a working day of around 9 hours. From around this 
time, legislation regulating non-factory employment permitted longer statutory 
hours than was normal either for core factory employment within the Acts, or for 
employments regulated by collective bargaining. This was the case for domestic 
workshops employing family members and ‘women-only workshops’ under the 
Factories Act of 1878, and for legislation such as the Shops Act 1886, which set a 
74-hour maximum week for shop assistants, and the Laundries Act 1907, which set 
a maximum 68-hour week. 
 
The Royal Commission on Labour which reported in 1894 came down against 
introducing statutory compulsion in the hours of adult male workers, but the minority 
trade union report was more favourable to legislative intervention, as were most of 
the general unions at this time.  Small steps were taken in the direction of more 
general legislative controls over working time in the Railway Servants (Hours of 
Labour) Act of 1893, the Factories and Workshops Act of 1895 and the Coal Mines 
Regulation Act of 1908, and, as we have seen, a statutory scheme of minimum wage 
setting was established for the coal industry in 1912.  However, most employment 
legislation of this period maintained the tradition of partial, as opposed to general, 
regulation.  ‘The law’, wrote Hutchins and Harrison in 1903,  ‘is still ostensibly   8
based on the idea of “protection for those who cannot help themselves”, instead of 
openly and avowedly adopting the more fruitful principle of raising the standard of 
life and health for the common good’ (Hutchins and Harrison, 1926: 309). 
 
The increasingly selective and subsidiary character of regulatory legislation was not 
accepted without opposition.  The general unions, in particular, supported the 
campaign for a statutory eight hour day at the TUC and in their evidence to the 1894 
Royal Commission.  The Commission discovered that  
 
reduction of the normal standard hours of labour has always been one of the 
leading objects of trade unions; the aim of the modern movement is the 
attainment of this end by legislation.  The working classes are as yet by no 
means unanimous as to the superiority of legislative over voluntary action in this 
matter; but to judge by the history of trade union congresses and other 
indications, the party of legislative intervention has been steadily gaining 
ground during recent years.
4  
 
The minority, trade-union influenced report of the 1894 Royal Commission argued, 
on the other hand, for statutory controls which would be generally applicable: 
 
for the mass of workers an eight hours day with the effective suppression of 
habitual overtime, can be secured only by further legislative enactment.  We 
have been much impressed by the great preponderance of working class 
witnesses in favour of the legal limitation of hours of labour, and still more by 
their practical unanimity as to the principle involved.  Nothing appears to us 
more striking than the almost universal acceptance and rapid development of the 




Regulations on a trade by trade basis, contrast, ‘would not only consume much 
valuable time, but would, in our judgment, result at best in a lopsided regulation of 
industry’.
6  Legislation should therefore set a universal eight hour standard, to be 
brought into effect gradually through orders made by the Board of Trade after 
consultation.   
 
However, the majority rejected a standard set of regulations for all trades as not ‘a 
proposal which bears serious examination’.
7 The majority report also considered, but 
rejected, a ‘trade exemption’ model, under which standard working hours would be   9
laid down by law, with the possibility of an exemption being granted on the basis of a 
vote of members of the relevant trade.  This was contrasted with the ‘trade option’, 
effectively the status quo of regulating working hours by collective agreement.  The 
‘trade exemption’ model had received support through TUC resolutions around the 
time the Commission was hearing evidence; Tom Mann, one of the union-based 
commissioners, proposed a variation under which statutory controls would come into 
force if three fifths of the workers in the trade voted for them.  The majority came 
down against the ‘exemption’ on the grounds of the difficulties and expense involved 
in organising a vote of all the workers concerned.  
 
At the same time, the majority did accept a significant extension of the legal power to 
regulate working hours.  Under the Factories and Workshops Act 1891, the Board of 
Trade had the power to make rules for employment in dangerous manufacturing 
processes; the majority suggested extending this power to permit the regulation of 
male working hours in selected industries. Section 28 of the Factories and Workshop 
Act 1895 was the result.  This authorised 
 
the making of special rules or requirements prohibiting the employment of, or 
modifying or limiting the period of employment for, all or any classes of 
persons in any process or particular description of manual labour which is 
certified by the Secretary of State... to be dangerous or injurious to health, or 
dangerous to life and limb. 
 
According to Hutchins and Harrison (1926: 203), ‘in these apparently unimportant 
provisions which at first sight read only like a trifling extension of regulations 
already enacted, the principle is however, implicitly granted that, cause being shown, 
the protection of the law can be extended to men as well as to women and children’.  
However, the section was not subsequently used as a basis for general working time 
regulation.  It was confined in its scope to the specific effect of long hours on health 
and safety.  Although the principle of state intervention to provide for safe and 
sanitary working conditions for all workers gradually took shape in numerous 
subsequent Acts and regulations governing health and safety, general legislation on 
hours and wages was not to emerge for another one hundred years. 
 
Subsequently the main instrument of regulation was the sector-level or multi-
employer collective agreement, covering employers in a given industry or trade.  
The state intervened directly through legislation only in those sectors of the 
economy where collective bargaining had failed to develop of its own accord   10
(mainly the sectors in which there were trade boards or wages councils).  Indirect 
government encouragement was given for voluntary arrangements for multi-
employer bargaining at industry or sector level, and these forms (collectively 
known as the ‘Joint Industrial Council’ model) became widespread in British 
industry during the inter-war period.  In the 1920s, a basic 48 hour week was 
established in the engineering industry by collective bargaining, and from this 
point on the national engineering agreement set a benchmark for industry-level 
practice.  The national engineering agreement brought about reductions in the basic 
working week to 44 hours in 1927, 42 hours in 1960, 40 hours in 1965 and 39 
hours in 1979.  Other sectors tended to follow engineering in reducing working 
hours after a gap of a few years.  For much of this period, although the basic week 
was being reduced, overall hours worked remained constant as overtime filled the 
gap (Flanders, 1964: 224-226).  Even at its height in the immediate post-1945 
period, the system of sectoral collective bargaining was more concerned with 
ensuring premium rates of pay for overtime and unsocial hours working, than with 
restricting working hours as such.  During the 1980s, what little legislation there 
was on the subject of working time was repealed, at the same time as sectoral 
collective agreements were also on the decline.  This process reflected the then 
policy of ‘lifting the burden’ of regulation in the labour market (Deakin, 1990). 
 
3.2 A new approach: the Working Time Directive of 1993 and the Working 
Time Regulations of 1998 and 1999 
 
Given this historical context, a significant cultural change seemed in prospect 
following the adoption of the Working Time Regulations 1998, implementing the 
EC Working Time Directive.  Thus Regulation 4(1) of the 1998 Working Time 
Regulations (henceforth ‘WTR’) replicating Article 6 of the Directive, provided 
that a worker’s working time, including overtime should not exceed an average of 
48 hours for each seven days over a basic reference period of 17 weeks.
8  A  
number of derogations were provided for in both the Directive and the 
Regulations. From the perspective of reflexive regulation, the most significant of 
these is Regulation 23, which concerns collective agreements and workforce 
agreements. Using ‘collective agreements and agreements between the two sides of 
industry at national or regional level’, as envisaged by the Directive, to implement, 
derogate or negotiate working time limits presented particular difficulties in 
translating the Directive into UK law.  Legislation dating from the 1970s has 
favoured the recognized trade union as the ‘single channel’ to worker representation.  
However, in Case C-383/92 Commission v. UK
9 the Court ruled that the UK had   11
failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 75/129/EEC (now 
Directive 98/59/EC) on collective redundancies by not providing a mechanism for 
the designation of workers’ representatives in an undertaking where the employer 
refused to recognise a trade union.  At this point, over half the British workforce 
worked in workplaces where trade unions were not recognised.  The ECJ’s ruling 
eventually led to the emergence of modified form of the single channel, where 
worker representation is primarily conducted by recognised trade union but, in the 
absence of such representation, workers can be represented by elected 
representatives who negotiate a ‘workforce agreement’.  This is the approach 
adopted in the Working Time Regulations.  Most importantly for current purposes, 
under regulation 23 a collective or workforce agreement can be used to vary the 
‘reference period’ over which the 48-hour week can be averaged from the default 
period of 17 weeks to up to 52 weeks for objective or technical reasons concerning 
the organisation of work. 
 
In addition, the UK took advantage of the individual opt-out permitted by Article 
18(1)(b) which allowed workers to agree with their employers that the 48 hour 
ceiling did not apply to them.  The 1998 Regulations laid down detailed record 
keeping rules but business complained that this ‘gold-plated’ the Directive.  As a 
result of amendments made to the Working Time Regulations in 1999
10 the record 
keeping requirements were significantly watered down. Regulation 4(1) now 
provides that ‘[u]nless his employer has first obtained the worker’s agreement in 
writing to perform such work a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any 
reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 
hours for each seven days’.  Regulation 4(2) simply requires the employer to ‘keep 
up-to-date records of all workers who carry out work to which it does not apply by 
reason of the fact that the employer has obtained the worker’s agreement as 
mentioned in paragraph (1)’. 
 
3.3 Working time in the context of the open method of coordination: the 
European Employment Strategy and corporate social responsibility 
 
At the European level, the Working Time Directive was conceived as a measure to 
protect health and safety, but over time been linked to other social and economic 
objectives and to the emerging CSR debate.  The Directive was adopted under the 
legal basis of Article 118a EC Treaty (now Art. 137), which provides that the 
Council shall adopt, by means of directives, minimum requirements for 
encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, to ensure a   12
better level of protection of the safety and health of workers.   However, several 
documents recently published by EU institutions emphasise the relationship 
between CSR and health and safety. The CSR Green Paper stressed that ‘within 
the company, socially responsible practices primarily involve employees and relate 
to issues such as…health and safety’.
11 Furthermore, the Council Resolution on 
CSR emphasised that ‘undertakings should address not only the external aspects of 
CSR, but also the internal aspects such as health and safety at work and 
management of human resources’.
12  
 
Likewise, the inter-linkage between CSR, health and safety and working time was 
expressed in the Commission Communication, Adapting to Change in Work and 
Society: a New Community Strategy on Health and Safety at Work 2002 – 2006.
13 
This Communication cross-refers to the Commission Green Paper on CSR, and 
stresses that ‘health at work is one of the ideal areas for voluntary “good practices” 
on the part of firms which want to go beyond existing rules and standards.’
14 The 
Communication also calls for ‘a global approach to well-being at work’ and states 
that,     
               
‘The objective of the Community’s policy on health and safety at work must 
be to bring about a continuing improvement in well-being at work, a concept 
which is taken to include the physical, moral and social dimensions. In 
addition, a number of complementary objectives must be targeted jointly by 
all the players…taking account of changes in forms of employment, work 
organisation arrangements and working time.’
15  
 
At the same time, the documentary evidence indicates that at the European level 
the relationship between CSR and working time is not viewed through the single 
lens of health and safety. Rather, EU level policymakers connect CSR and working 
time through the dual prism of health and safety on the one hand and the 
modernisation of work organisation linked to the European Employment Strategy 
on the other. This dual vision is evident in the Commission’s 2002 
Communication,  Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to 
Sustainable Development. This states that, ‘employment and social policy 
incorporates the principles of CSR, in particular, through the European 
Employment Strategy… and the Health and Safety Strategy.’
16  
 
The harnessing of the Working Time Directive to the OMC and specifically to the 
European Employment Strategy follows the adoption of the Lisbon strategy to   13
make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic, knowledge based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion.
17 The Lisbon European Council stated that ‘adaptability 
through flexible management of working time and job rotation’ was one of the key 
areas to be addressed in developing an active employment policy and more and 
better jobs for Europe.
18 In this context, it is noteworthy that the Commission 
President Romano Prodi should have expressed the view that the Lisbon European 
Council made ‘a special appeal to companies’ corporate sense of social 
responsibility regarding best practices on…work organisation’.
19  
 
The Lisbon strategy reinforces the Employment Strategy for the attainment of a 
high level of and subsequently full employment.
20 Indeed, the conclusions of the 
Lisbon European Council make a direct link with the Luxembourg process: the 
Lisbon strategy is designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions for full 
employment, and to strengthen regional cohesion in the European Union.
21 Reform 
of working time is part of the process of modernising work organisation, which in 
turn is central to the adaptability pillar of the employment guidelines adopted 
under the Luxembourg strategy.   
 
The 2002 Employment Guidelines provide that ‘in order to promote the 
modernisation of work organisation and forms of work, which inter alia contribute 
to improvements in quality of work, a strong partnership should be developed at 
appropriate levels (European, national, sectoral, local and enterprise levels)’. 
Accordingly, the social partners are invited ‘to negotiate and implement at all 
appropriate levels agreements to modernise the organisation of work, including 
flexible working arrangements, with the aim of making undertakings productive, 
competitive and adaptable to industrial change, achieving the required balance 
between flexibility and security, and increasing the quality of jobs.’ Subjects to be 
covered include working time issues such as the reduction of working hours, the 
reduction of overtime, the expression of working time as an annual figure, the 
development of part-time working, access to career breaks, and associated job 
security issues.
22  In much the same vein, the Nice European Council Conclusions 
on the European Social Agenda talk of ‘supporting initiatives linked to the social 
responsibility of undertakings’ and supplementing ‘Community legislation on 
working time’.
 23  
 
Turning now to the UK, the British government has made clear that in general 
terms the improvement of working conditions is a key element of CSR. For   14
example, the government has been keen to set out ‘the business case for CSR’ to 
explain why companies should ‘spend time and energy on helping communities, on 
protecting the environment or on improving working conditions’.
24. However, in 
more specific terms the UK government’s discourse on the relationship between 
CSR and working time has concentrated on promoting work-life balance as an 
important element of the CSR agenda and in turn has portrayed working time 
regulation as underpinning the work-life balance agenda.  
 
The UK government’s coupling of the work-life balance agenda to the CSR agenda 
is evident in Business and Society: Developing Corporate Social Responsibility in 
the UK. In demonstrating ‘the strength of the business case’ the DTI points to the 
report by the Business Impact Task Force
25 indicating that ‘a company’s approach 
to managing…work/life balance [is] central to competitiveness’ (emphasis 
added).
26 A subsequent DTI publication, Business and Society: Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report 2002, further illustrates how the UK government views 
work–life balance as ‘a central plank of CSR’.
27 In a section of this publication 
entitled ‘Legal frameworks: embedding responsible behaviour’ the DTI argued that 
‘the Employment Bill [now the Employment Act 2002] underlines the 
government’s commitment to create highly productive, modern and successful 
workplaces through fairness and partnership at work. It will deliver a balanced 
package of support for working parents while reducing red tape for employers. It 
will simplify rules governing leave and pay for maternity, paternity and adoption’ 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2002a: 14)  
 
Although this particular publication highlights the significance of maternity and 
parental polices, other DTI publications illustrate how the government conceives 
of the Working Time Regulations as a fundamental element of the legislative 
framework underpinning the work-life balance agenda. One such publication is 
called, Work-life Balance: The Business Case. Your Business Can’t Afford to Miss 
It (Department of Trade and Industry, 2002b).  A section of this publication setting 
out ‘the legislative imperative’ of the work-life balance agenda refers to the 
provisions of the Working Time Regulations along with other regulatory 
provisions on disability, maternity leave, parental leave, part-time working, 
paternity leave and time-off for dependants (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2002b: 42-43).  Another DTI publication, The Essential Guide to Work-Life 
Balance, also indicates that the Working Time Regulations provide a regulatory 
underpinning for the work-life balance agenda. In this publication the provisions of   15
the Working Time Regulations are referred to in a section entitled ‘Rules and regs 
– the letter of the law’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 2002c: 60).  
 
It should also be noted that in its approach to implementing the Working Time 
Directive, the current Labour administration has accepted that the regulation of 
working time is fundamental to the enhancement of a productive workforce, a view 
which fits in with the EU position on the link between working time laws and the 
adaptability pillar of the Employment Guidelines. Thus the Fairness at Work 
White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998: para.5.6.) stated that ‘there 
is no advantage to employers in exhausted employees. On the contrary, the need to 
work within fair maximum hours is likely to promote more efficient working 
practices and innovation’. 
 
The documentary evidence therefore suggests that policymakers at both EU and 
UK Government level have strong conceptions of the relationship between CSR 
and working time.  How has this link been realised in practice? 
 
4. The Working Time Directive and the industrial relations system
28 
 
4.1 Methodology of the empirical study 
 
The European Commission initiated a review of the WTD in 2002.  Directive 
93/104 states that the provision allowing individuals to opt-out from the 48-hour 
working week
29 is to be reviewed before the expiry of a period of seven years after 
the Directive came into force (on 23 November 1996). As part of the review 
process the authors of the present paper were commissioned by the Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs to produce a report on the use and 
necessity of the individual opt-out in the UK. Although the report concentrated on 
how extensively opt-outs have been used, the reasons why they have been used and 
the potential for using other derogations, the study also addressed the issue of how 
industrial relations actors perceive the relationship between working time 
regulation and corporate social responsibility. 
 
The study was based on evidence gained from a total of forty interviews conducted 
in the period August-November 2002. Interviews were conducted with a range of 
public officials with responsibility for working time. The officials represented the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS); Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and a Local   16
Government Environmental Health Department. A search of the register of cases at 
the offices of the Employment Tribunal Service (ETS) was undertaken. An 
employment law practitioner was also interviewed. Interviews were also carried 
out with twelve trade union officers,
30 the TUC, seven employers’ organisations,
31 
and HR managers in thirteen case study employers. Table 1 sets out the 
characteristics of the case study employers.  Here, a ‘unionised’ employer is one 
which recognised an independent trade union for the purposes of collective 
bargaining for all or part of its workforce.   
 
Table 1: Characteristics of case study employers 
 
NAME  SECTOR / DESCRIPTION  UK 
STAFF  
UNIONISED 
     
  HEALTH    
H1  Hospital Trust providing emergency and 
elective acute medical services 
6000 Yes   
H2  Hospital Trust providing emergency and 
elective acute medical services 
5000 Yes 
      
  MANUFACTURING / ENGINEERING    
ME1  A first tier manufacturer supplying 
components directly to the automotive industry
148 Yes 
ME2  Manufacturer of high pressure aluminium die 
castings mainly for the automotive industry 
420 No 
ME3  Subsidiary of an international construction 
company specialising in foundation and 
underground engineering.  
220 Yes 
ME4  Service engineers for supermarket commercial 
refrigeration equipment. Another (unionised) 




4.2  The impact upon working hours  
 
A number of studies have demonstrated that while the new regulation has had 
some impact in terms of reducing working hours and stimulating changes to 
working practices, the familiar features of the system remain largely intact.  A 
TUC study from February 2002, based on analysis of the government’s Labour 
Force Survey and a TUC-commissioned survey, suggests that the numbers 
working in excess of 48 hours per week has fallen by only 3.5% since the   17
implementation of the Working Time Regulations. According to the TUC report, 
nearly 4 million persons or 16% of the labour force were working over 48 hours 
per week compared to 3.3 million (then 15%) in the early 1990s, and that the 
numbers working over 55 hours per week had risen to 1.5 million.  The average 
working week for the UK was 43.6 hours, compared to an EU-wide average of 
40.3 hours.  Long hours were particularly prevalent among managerial and 
professional workers of both sexes, and among male workers in more highly 
skilled jobs in manufacturing, construction and transport.  The main reason given 
by managers and professionals for working long hours was excessive workloads, 
while for manual workers it was the need to enhance earnings through overtime.
32   
 
A DTI research note (Hicks, 2002) reported in July 2002 that 16% of all 
employees and 22% of full-time employees were working over 48 hours per week 
in the spring of 2001.  Three quarters of those working such long hours were men.  
Almost 9% of full-time employees were working over 48 hours per week without 
receiving overtime.  This note also reported that long-hours working in excess of 
the 48-hour figure differed substantially across occupational groups.  The highest 
proportions of employees working in excess of 48 hours per week were found in 
‘managers and senior officials’ (37%), ‘professional occupations’ (30%) and 
‘process, plant and machine operatives’ (28%).   By industry, the sectors reporting 
the highest numbers of workers working for more than 48 hours per week were 
‘agriculture and fishing’, ‘transport and communication’, ‘construction’ and 
‘energy and water’, which were all in excess of 25%.
33 
 
This DTI research also reported on the impact of the WTR 1998.  The proportion 
of employees reporting that they regularly worked for more than 48 hours per 
week fell slightly in 1998, and this small reduction was repeated in 1999, 2000 and 
2001.  Prior to this, the numbers reporting hours over 48 per week had risen 
consistently since the early 1980s.  The fall in hours after 1999 was driven by a 
reduction in the hours of male workers.  The DTI note attempted to estimate one of 
the possible effects of removing the individual opt-out from the 48 hour week, by 
calculating the numbers employed for more than 48 hours a week over period in 
excess of the default reference period of 17 weeks.  Analysis of the Labour Force 
Survey showed that 16% of all full-time employees or three million individuals 
approximately usually worked more than 48 hours per week on two successive 
quarterly reporting points (three months), and 10%, or two million individuals, 
over five successive quarters (twelve months).  On this basis it was concluded that 
‘approximately three million people would be affected by a removal of the   18
[individual] opt-out in the UK (because they said that they usually worked for over 
48 hours on two successive quarters when they were interviewed)’.  While a 
segment of this group could benefit from collective or workforce agreements with 
lengthened the normal 17-week reference period, the note concluded that this 
would not help the 2 million working in excess of 48 hours per week on a year-
round basis.  However, the note did not consider that a certain proportion of this 
group might fall under the derogation for ‘unmeasured working time’ provided for 
in Regulation 20.   
 
Case study evidence on employers’ responses to the WTR is provided by Neathey 
and Arrowsmith’s 2001 study, carried out for the DTI.
34  This research was based 
on a non-random sample of 20 employers, selected to reflect a variety of different 
types of organisations.  Around a third of the sample reported that, as a result of 
the implementation of the Regulations, working practices had been reviewed with 
the aim of putting in place a ‘work smarter’ strategy.  Shorter working hours 
and/or the reduction of operating time to a reduced number of working days had 
led to greater flexibility of employment and, in some cases, improved operational 
efficiency and customer satisfaction.  However, half of the sample reported that the 
Regulations had had little or no impact on them. These organisations tended to be 
smaller establishments, those making use of individual opt-outs and/or derogations 
established through collective agreements or workforce agreements, and those with 
working practices which were already in line with the Regulations.   
 
The study found that management had been proactive in implementing the new 
standards, and that while there was evidence that collective agreements (in five 
case) and workforce agreements (in three cases) had been used to implement 
derogations and flexible working arrangements, the principal form of employee 
involvement was consultation rather than negotiation.  The individual opt out was 
the most common response to the need to provide for working in excess of the 48-
hour week, but collective and workforce agreements were also used to change 
reference periods.  A number of sample employers had also achieved compliance 
with the 48-hour week by changing working practices, increasing staffing levels, 
and revising shift arrangements. 
 
Neathey and Arrowsmith’s case studies were supplemented by evidence from the 
Warwick Pay and Working Time Survey.  This is based on a sample of around 300 
employers in four sectors (printing, engineering, health, and retail).  The WTR was 
reported to be a significant factor in changing working time practice, in particular   19
in health, printing and retail, but to a lesser degree in engineering.  Around half of 
printing and engineering employers, three out of five NHS trusts and virtually all 
the retail employers had either made or proposed a collective or workforce 
agreement in order to derogate from aspects of the WTR.  Unions were involved in 
changes in all but one of the relevant NHS trusts, half of the print employers, and 
two thirds of the engineering and retail employers.  Two thirds of engineering 
employers reported making use of individual opt-outs, along with half of the 
sample in each of the other three sectors. 
 
These existing studies therefore suggest that the extensive use of individual opt-out 
agreements has been a significant reason for the relatively limited impact of the 
Working Time Regulations. In our sample, about 90% of the workforce had opted 
out in most case study employers in the manufacturing and engineering and 
financial and legal sectors. Almost 100% of supervisory and managerial staff in the 
Hospitality sector had signed opt-out agreements.
35 Hospital Trusts used opt-outs 
extensively in areas where there were labour shortages such as radiologists, 
pathologists, anaesthetists, career grade doctors and some nurses.
36 More generally, 
CBI survey evidence reported by the TUC indicates 47% of companies use opt-
outs (TUC, 2002). 
 
4.3 Industrial relations mechanisms and the perceived conflict between the 
Working Time Regulations and business efficiency  
 
It was evident from the interview evidence explaining why individual opt-outs are 
used that the impact of the working time regulations has been limited because there 
is a deeply embedded perception held by many employers that limiting the average 
working week to 48 hours would impair what they see as business efficiency 
considerations.  
 
Several employers, in particular in the manufacturing and engineering sector and in 
financial and legal services, argued that if the opt-out were not available, the costs 
of running their business would increase significantly as they would have to recruit 
more labour to do the work. Furthermore, additional recruitment would create 
practical problems and indirect costs, such as the need for extra plant and 
machinery or extra space in the office, staff restaurant or staff car park. The EEF 
relayed to us the opinion of a domestic appliance manufacturer that ‘the consumer 
will have to bear’ the ‘significant cost’ of complying with the 48-hour limit, which 
‘will make our products less competitive against foreign competition.’  Moreover,   20
not all companies are able to pass on additional costs. For example, one of the 
small engineering companies in our sample believed that they could ultimately be 
put out of business because they supplied a major motor manufacturer, and the 
terms of their contract dictated that there should be annual price decreases.  
 
Some employers made the slightly different argument that existing staff were 
trained and experienced, and that it would therefore be more efficient to utilise 
them for longer hours than to recruit additional staff. Furthermore, the investment 
banks and international law firm argued that it was necessary to develop very 
strong personal relationships so as to support the needs of very demanding clients. 
Their business was therefore ‘often personality driven, so you really want the same 
person doing the work.’
37  Moreover, critical knowledge of issues involved in 
particular projects was often stored in the minds of individuals rather than being 
written down. So, additional recruitment and limiting individuals to 48 hours per 
week was not seen as a practical way forward.  
 
Certain employers also argued that individual opt-outs provided operational 
flexibility that could not be satisfactorily compensated for even by averaging the 
48-hour limit over a reference period as long as 52 weeks. For example, a 
subsidiary of the food manufacturer, a bakery, supplied supermarkets and orders 
fluctuated by as much as 50% on a daily basis. The company felt that the opt-out 
was necessary because it was not feasible to handle such wide daily fluctuations in 
demand through a formalised system of annualised hours. Similarly, the 
investment banks and the international law firm in our sample said that opt-outs 
were necessary because merger and acquisition deals required intense periods of 
working so as to complete documents and to finalise deals within very strict time 
scales. These firms felt that although it was possible to compensate for these 
intense working periods through informal systems of time off in lieu, it was not 
feasible to plan these periods into a formal annualised hours system. The CBI also 
argued that it is not always straightforward to move to annualised hours or other 
systems based on reference periods because ‘you have still got to do enormous 
amounts of monitoring and to know exactly what people are doing.’ 
 
On the other hand, there was evidence supporting the claim that long hours 
working can lead to the inefficient utilisation of labour. For example, one of the 
small engineering companies said that on some occasions, when they had asked 
workers to do additional shifts and extra hours to meet demand, ‘the following 
week half of them go sick. So, it does not always pay’. The HR Director of a   21
subsidiary of food manufacturer ME6 also accepted their 57½ hour standard week 
(39 hours basic and the rest paid as overtime) was unproductive because workers 
were often tired. But, without any legislative imperative to implement change it 
was difficult for the company to ‘make people suddenly lose their hours because 
they have mortgages based on this level of income.’ According to the AMICUS 
representative we interviewed, long hours working was not so much at the core of 
British business efficiency as a reflection of ‘the British disease of low 
productivity.’ In his view, this reflected a culture traditionally concerned with 
‘measuring inputs into the process rather than measuring outputs or outcomes.   
Typically a manager will be asked by his superior, “how many [overtime] hours 
have you got in this week?” And if they are in then the manager is praised rather 
than being condemned for not being able to do the work in the right time.’  
 
Other evidence illustrated how reducing working hours could improve efficiency. 
The Working Time Officer we interviewed told us of one firm which ‘had done a 
cost exercise, got lots of additional staff in, cut down the overtime, and in the 
longer term they have actually saved money because [they do not have] all the 
overtime to pay for.’ AMICUS also provided two examples where union 
representatives and employers had jointly recognised the ‘disadvantages in going 
along the long hours route [because] much of the overtime they were doing simply 
reflected low productivity.’  In these particular companies issues had been resolved 
through negotiation and ‘there has been a great deal of partnership and co-
operation at the local level in improving productivity.’  
 
On this basis, several respondents on the trade union side argued that the use of 
individual opt-outs was disadvantageous for UK business because it meant that 
both employers and unions could avoid negotiating over the reorganisation of 
working patterns, with the effect that inefficient practices were perpetuated. 
According to the TUC, ‘the Working Time Regulations have [thus] been a much 
less useful instrument to reduce working time and to go through this process of 
thinking about pay, hours and productivity because the individual opt-out was 
implemented.’
38 Several union respondents pointed to the difficulty of voluntarily 
negotiating reductions in working hours without any legislative imperative to do so 
when the consequence would be lower earnings and living standards for their 
members. The TUC acknowledged that this explained why work reorganisation 
has not been high on many union agendas.  
   22
The notion that the individual opt-out is a barrier to innovation was given further 
weight by the CBI acknowledgement that ‘certain companies may be over reliant 
on the individual opt-out [in that] there are currently companies out there that have 
yet to begin that process of reorganising working [patterns] where it is warranted.’ 
Also, the EEF were disappointed that there had not been more innovation in work 
organisation: ‘We certainly expected that the introduction of the Working Time 
Regulations, in particular the 48 hours, would encourage rather more companies to 
think about [changing working patterns], certainly annualised hours. There has 
been an interest, but I don’t think it has been quite as prevalent as we thought it 
might have been.’ 
 
In addition, the TUC pointed to some examples where employers had been 
motivated to negotiate changes in the belief that the opt-out will be removed 
following the review of the Working Time Directive in 2003. One such case was a 
dairy company where 70 hours per week had been the norm because of the need to 
meet the requirements of supermarkets. However, the company had moved to 
annualised hours, had offered employees a range of shift patterns between 40 and 
48 hours per week, and now produced the same amount of milk more efficiently. 
The TUC argued that these examples of negotiating in the shadow of an 
anticipated change in the law illustrated how the availability of the opt-out was 
presently a barrier to innovation. 
 
On the other hand, there was also evidence indicating that use of the individual 
opt-out does not necessarily preclude innovation. In the study by Neathey and 
Arrowsmith, referred to above, three-quarters of the case studies were using 
individual opt-outs but twelve of the twenty organisations had seen changes in 
their working time arrangements. In most cases changes were prompted by 
competitive pressures to better meet customer needs.
39 In our study all thirteen case 
study employers used opt-outs, but nine of them had recently introduced changes 
in working practices. In some cases this amounted to the introduction of flexible 
working. In other cases, such as the two small engineering manufacturers ME1 and 
ME2, there had been radical reorganisation of shift patterns.  
 
ME1 said it had been through  ‘a massive change process with changing working 
practices accompanied by job losses.’ The company previously worked a day shift 
and a night shift four days per week, ‘which allowed everyone to work overtime on 
Friday and Saturday.’ The company had now moved to ‘double-day shifting of 6 
a.m. – 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. – 10 p.m., working five days a week.’ ME2 used to run a   23
day shift of 8am-4.15pm and a night shift of 8 p.m. – 8 a.m. for four nights per 
week. The company now operates alternating day shifts of one week 6 a.m. – 2.15 
p.m. and the following week of 2 p.m. - 10.15 p.m. There is also a fixed night shift 
of 10 p.m. – 6.15 a.m. Both companies stressed the changes were not driven by the 
Working Time Regulations. ME1 had been taken over by a French sister company 
and the French management had introduced a more ‘continental culture.’ More 
significantly, the company had suffered a 50% reduction in demand ‘due to market 
conditions, closures in the automotive industry and relocation to foreign countries.’ 
According to ME2, ‘the main driving force…whether there was a Working Time 
Directive or not, was that [the previous shift pattern] was not operationally 
economic for us. So, by our own process of change we changed it to three shifts.’ 
Both companies believed it was necessary to retain the individual opt-out. 
 
4.4  The inability of the industrial relations system to support collective 
derogations 
 
As pointed out above, the European Commission views moves to calculating 
working hours on an annualised basis as an important element of modernising 
work organisation. The Working Time Directive provides for the reference period 
for averaging the 48-hour limit to be extended from 17 weeks to up to twelve 
months by means of collective agreements or agreements between the two sides of 
industry at national or regional level.
40 Only four case study employers had used 
either a collective or workforce agreement to extend the reference period beyond 
the default of 17 weeks. 
 
A major problem with using collective agreements to vary the reference period is 
that effective mechanisms of employee representation are lacking in many UK 
workplaces. Figures from the Labour Force Survey published in 2002 reveal that 
only 29.1% of employees in the UK were union members and only 48% of 
employees were in a workplace where trade union members were present. 
Moreover, the pay of only 36% of UK employees’ was affected by collective 
agreement, and in the private sector collective bargaining coverage was only 
22%.
41 In contrast, in most other EU Member States 70% or more of employees 
are covered by collective agreements, multi-employer bargaining prevails and 
there are legal mechanisms for the extension of the terms of collective agreements. 
In the UK, single employer bargaining prevails and there are no mechanisms 
supporting sectoral collective agreements along continental European lines. 
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This is not to portray some British or Anglo-Saxon ‘model’ standing next to and 
contrasting with a Continental European ‘model’. The institutional systems that 
underpin and support the labour market differ widely across the EU. The rest of the 
EU does not comprise one collective alternative. The British ‘model’ is therefore 
not one of two but one of several models in Europe, all of which are evolving. 
Nevertheless, the CBI did argue that the general difference between the British 
system and the collectivist industrial relations systems in Continental Europe was 
extremely important:  
 
‘Of course we are the only country to take advantage of the individual opt-out, 
but that does not mean to say that we are somehow a case apart. There are 
many other opportunities in the Directive for flexibility and each country will 
naturally take what is tailored to its own labour market… For the UK it is the 
individual opt-out versus the collective agreement…If you have a collective 
agreement system then it is an entirely different matter. You can approach it 
in an entirely different way. That is one of the reasons why [the Directive] can 
have an effect [in the UK] that is entirely different.” 
 
Workforce agreements (‘WFAs’) could provide an alternative in non-unionised 
workplaces.
42 A WFA can be completed directly with groups of workers or their 
representatives, and are designed to provide a mechanism for employers to agree 
working time arrangements with workers who do not have any terms and conditions 
set by collective agreement.
43 However, from the evidence it would seem that their 
incidence across the UK is extremely limited. An Institute of Personnel and 
Development survey indicates that only 18% of employers had introduced or were 
thinking of introducing a WFA (IPD, 1999). None of the case study employers in 
our sample had considered a WFA and the entire study, although not exhaustive, 
revealed evidence of only seven such agreements.
44  
 
The prevalence of opt-outs and limited use of workforce agreements in non-
unionised workplaces was explained in the interviews by two factors. First, 
employers are daunted by the complexity of the WFA procedure. The EEF told us 
that they had drafted a WFA for a firm of service engineers, but that the firm had 
been so daunted by the procedure they decided to issue individual opt-outs instead. 
Secondly, the WFA route was perceived as contrary to the culture of British 
industrial relations. On the one hand, Britain has a tradition of ‘single channel’ 
employee representation through recognised trade unions. On the other hand, the 
legal practitioner suggested that none of the non-unionised employers he dealt with   25
would have the structures in place to create a WFA. This view is supported to 
some extent by evidence from the most recent Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS) which suggests that only 20% of workplaces with less than 100 
employees and only 43% of workplaces with 100-999 employees operated some 
kind of ‘joint consultative committee’.
45  Moreover, even if the structures were in 
place, the legal practitioner believed employers ‘would not want to be seen to be 
negotiating with the workforce about these sorts of issues… which are classic 
collective bargaining issues.’ The CBI also suggested that staff representatives on 
consultative committees would not want to step into the shoes of an absent trade 
union and start negotiating terms and conditions.
46 
 
The study therefore highlighted the potential difficulties of transplanting a 
regulatory framework into an unreceptive environment. In this sense the individual 
opt-out can be seen as being responsive to the present characteristics of the British 
industrial relations system. In contrast to collective derogations, the individual opt-
out provides employers with a low-cost and simple to administer mechanism to 
avoid the 48-hour limit. Collective derogations are complex to arrange, in 
particular for employers who, in the absence of a recognized trade union, only 
have available the route of a workforce agreement.  
 
 
5. Perceptions of working time as a CSR issue 
 
5.1 Recognition of the relationship between CSR, health and safety and 
working time  
 
There was evidence in the interviews suggesting that some employers and 
employers’ associations recognise the interrelationship between working time 
regulation, health and safety and CSR. According to the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD), 
 
‘There is an ethical issue about working time…employers believe there are 
ethical issues underpinning the Regulations… Even though employers did not 
welcome the [Working Time Regulations] our members told us that they did 
understand what the Regulations were driving at. They did oppose the 
Regulations as a matter of principle… [but] there was, certainly in the HR 
community, an understanding that there were issues about health which 
arguably are ethical issues.’   26
International law firm FL3 also accepted broader concerns about responsibility for 
the health of employees are underlying the Working Time Regulations. Hospital 
Trust H2 believed that, ‘there is quite a lot to be said for corporate social 
responsibility for public organisations, in particular from a risk management point 
of view. If you look at the research that says people working long hours are not 
giving of their best, then I think [working time is an element of CSR]. There is an 
issue about the service to patients when people who are overtired are not making 
quality decisions.’  
 
However, other evidence suggested that employers have not been fully receptive to 
the discourse of EU level policymakers. There are two aspects to this. In part it is 
due to the fact that EU level policymakers have distorted and blurred their own 
communication by conducting the discourse on working time regulation and CSR 
through the dual prism of both health and safety and modernising work 
organisation. According to the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF), 
 
‘There are rather confused messages about it. If it really is, and I recognise 
this is open to question, a health and safety measure, we are kind of then 
saying what effect is this having on competitiveness, and is this promoting 
competitiveness or will this impact on competitiveness. [This] seems to start 
to straddle rather different issues…And then it is talked about [in terms of] 
what effect will this have on competition as if it is a measure that is 
unconnected with health and safety.’ 
 
In addition the CBI argued that cognisance of the Working Time Regulations as a 
resource for promoting modernisation of work organisation and business efficiency 
was diminished and distorted by the fact that the Working Time Directive was 
conceived as a measure to protect health and safety. According to the CBI, ‘the 
Working Time Regulations are there to protect workers with a basic set of 
minimum standards. The role of the Working Time Regulations is not to act as a 
catalyst [for more efficient working practices]. That should not be the intention of 
the legislation.’ 
 
The second aspect is that some employers have formed their own, alternative 
conception of their social responsibility. This is demonstrated by the fact that three 
case study employers argued that responsibility for employees’ health and safety is 
counterbalanced by a perceived social responsibility to provide employees with a 
decent standard of living job security. For example, construction firm ME4 said   27
that, ‘we aim to be a good employer at all times, with health and safety of our 
workers paramount.  [However], increased earning potential as a result of overtime 
availability obviously affects the employee and their family in bringing increased 
affluence.’ Food manufacturer ME6 also argued that there was a balance to be 
made between CSR for working time and providing workers with a decent 
standard of living. 
 
‘If you asked me that question [i.e. is working time an aspect of CSR?] in 
isolation I would say ‘yes’. If you said to me how do you feel about working 
for a business as a personnel director where your employees are working a 
sixty-hour week I would say ‘I do not like it. It is wrong.’ But it is not that 
simple. I would also say that we have a responsibility to pay our people a 
liveable wage. If the only way they can earn a liveable wage is to work long 
hours then we have to live with that. You cannot go out on a limb as a 
company and overpay your people or you will not survive and you will not 
have jobs at all. So, it is not that simple. It is not one-dimensional. I also think 
we have a number of other responsibilities and it is getting a balance between 
them all.’ 
 
Foreign-owned car manufacturer ME5 also argued that a balance had to be made 
between different elements of CSR:  
 
‘Clearly [working time is part of CSR]. It is part of a wider responsibility, 
which in our case is health and safety. We have been nominated number one 
company in the UK for health and safety. But, you can also link CSR to job 
security and particularly for our kind of work, where it is shop floor manual 
work, job security is the number one attraction… Overtime flexibility allows 
us to ride out the peaks and troughs. That in turn allows us to provide job 
security [for workers]. So, you cannot just look at one particular aspect [of 
CSR]… Obviously making sure people have an appropriate financial stability 
is another aspect as well as making sure that people have a reasonable work 
situation whether that is in terms of facilities, working hours etc. All those 
things need to be balanced.’ 
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5.2  Recognition of the relationship between CSR, work-life balance and 
working time  
 
There was evidence indicating that some employers do conceive of a correlation 
between working time, work-life balance and corporate social responsibility. Hotel 
chain HC2 said that working time is ‘absolutely’ an element of corporate social 
responsibility given that ‘one of our values is around being people centred [and we 
have] a very strong culture around how we should treat our associates in terms of 
being really positive with them. There is nothing in the Working Time Regulations 
that is counterproductive to that.’ According to investment bank FL1, ‘I think [the 
Working Time Regulations] have had a small positive role in increasing awareness 
of, I suppose, a social view that there should be a greater work-life balance.’ The 
respondent at ACAS also believed that at least some employers perceive there to 
be such a correlation: ‘I think the [Working Time Regulations] are a part of the 
[work-life balance] agenda… I think it is part of…a general move towards good 
employment conditions and caring employers…corporate responsibility in that 
respect.’ Furthermore, the finance industry union UNIFI was impressed by the 
approach taken by a major high street bank with regard to CSR and work-life 
balance: 
 
‘It is all about peoples’ lives outside work and having some sort of 
responsibility for your workforce beyond just getting the last pound of flesh 
from them… It is about attracting the best staff and keeping them.  It is also 
about promoting a positive image in the labour market and to customers. But, 
I think there is a belief in the moral aspects as well… They mean it.  They 
really, really mean it and the business imperative underlies the moral desire to 
do things right.’ 
 
However, other evidence indicated that many UK employers do not recognise the 
interrelationship between working time regulation, work-life balance and corporate 
social responsibility in the same way as the UK Government. Some evidence 
demonstrated that even where there is recognition of the linkage between CSR and 
work-life balance, very few employers regard the regulation of working time as 
underpinning the work-life balance agenda. For example, the Institute of Directors 
(IOD) distinguished between the Working Time Regulations, which they opposed, 
and corporate social responsibility for working time, of which they were in favour:  
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‘Certainly from any official announcements on policy from the IOD centrally 
I think we would assume that working time is an issue that comes under the 
rubric of corporate social responsibility and I am sure a lot of individual 
directors would take that view as well… As well as obviously wanting to look 
after ones workers as well as one can in terms of not actually imposing long 
hours upon them we know from our own research that a lot of directors have 
made quite liberal or progressive moves to workplace flexibility. We know a 
large number of directors, for example, allow employees to work at home or 
to work flexi-time and we know they are great supporters of part time work… 
So, in that respect I think it is quite a nice little counterbalance towards our 
attitudes towards the Working Time Regulations.’ 
 
Similarly, the HR director of hospital trust H1 did not recognise the regulation of 
working time as part of the work-life balance agenda:  
 
‘Outside of the local authority we are the biggest employer in the area and so 
we have a social responsibility. Working hours is part of that…it is called 
“Improving Working Lives” in the NHS… We are running a project to co-
ordinate childcare arrangements across the two health communities we 
serve…We have had an enormous amount of success with employee led 
rostering… So, I think it is issues like that that have more impact than the 
regulations on working time… Giving people control of their own working 
patterns is a real benefit for them and if we are serious about the work-life 
balance, regulation should assist that process not inhibit it.’ 
 
The TUC also indicated that employers view the regulation of working time as 
distinct from the work-life balance agenda:  
 
‘[Employers] might say something about work-life balance. But I think that 
has got more to do with increased participation in the labour market by 
women who are…looking for flexibility that enables them to balance their 
work and their caring responsibilities… And employers understanding better 
that to retain good employees they need to offer them a degree of flexibility 
on family friendly issues… Some flexibility of hours, the right to work part-
time, perhaps paid paternity leave or paid parental leave. But, that is about it. 
It is that angle that gets picked up, if it gets picked up at all, in the CSR 
debate… But, this does not get to the really difficult question which is what 
are you going to do about all the people who are working more than 48 and   30
around about 60 hours per week… My sense is that the two rhetorics of 
excessive working hours on the one hand and work-life balance on the other 
are still going down separate tracks.’ 
 
 
5.3  Viewing CSR as an ‘external issue’ 
 
There was evidence that employers conceive of CSR as incorporating a set of 
external issues concerning the image and reputation of the company rather than the 
issue of its employment conditions. According to the TUC, 
 
‘Employment standards in British companies is not something that has 
featured as an aspect of CSR. CSR is about poor people in developing 
countries. It is not about how you treat your workers at home. We are 
struggling to work with Business in the Community to try and get their 
member organisations to understand that it is important. The way you treat 
your workforce is a hallmark of how responsible you are as an employer and 
as a company. But, I would say it has simply not featured in the mainstream 
of the CSR debate at all.’ 
 
AMICUS provided a similar view about companies’ attitudes to the content of 
CSR. 
 
‘CSR is what happens outside the workplace as far as [companies] are 
concerned. It does not relate at all to what goes on within. Many of the 
companies that have apparently good policies on [CSR] issues are some of the 
worst examples of working hours. Not so much with their own staff, but three 
quarters of the staff they employ are contractors and they know that the 
contracts that they issue must demand that the contracted staff work these 
additional hours. It is the only way it can happen.’ 
 
Evidence from the EEF also illustrated the external orientation of CSR policies in 
many companies: 
  
‘I do not think the Working Time Regulations are seen as a central part of 
CSR. I think CSR is very much external. One of the criticisms that we, as well 
as others, had about the Commission’s [Green] Paper was that it was so 
focussed on the workforce. We said, ‘hold on a minute, we thought CSR was   31
about the environment, exploitation of child labour you know those sorts of 
issues’. We were very surprised to see that this was a DG Employment agenda 
being pushed through under the guise of CSR. To some extent that has an 
educational function [as some employers] have now learnt that some of their 
company policies are CSR… if they can tie it into CSR then they see it as a 
bonus. But they will have focussed on building relationships with the 
community and relationships with schools, and the environmental [aspects]. I 
do not think their focus has changed at all.’  
 
The respondent from the CIPD endorsed the view that most employers conceive of 
CSR as relating to external matters: 
 
‘As far as they do, [companies] usually think of [CSR] in relation to 
community activities or terms and conditions of overseas workers, company 
reputation. They take a very external view of CSR. I would be very cautious 
about putting the words working time and CSR together because I do not 
think the debate takes place in those terms.’ 
 
Similarly, the HR Director of investment bank FL1 believed that ‘to a large extent’ 
CSR is conceived in terms of external factors like the environment and the 
community. So, although the firm was ‘quite good in terms of our involvement in 
the community like monetary donations’ he was ‘not convinced [working time] 
would be viewed automatically’ as an aspect of CSR.   
 
This interview evidence appears to indicate a significant dissonance between the 
conceptions of employers and policymakers as to what constitutes CSR. However, 
the emphasis given to the external dimension of CSR by UK employers can be 
seen as reflecting the UK Government’s discourse on CSR. This is evident form an 
examination of the two major DTI publications on CSR, Business and Society: 
Developing Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK
47 and Business and Society: 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002.
48 These publications make only brief 
mention of internal issues such as improving working conditions, workforce 
diversity and work-life balance. Moreover, the content of both publications is very 
much weighted towards the external dimension of CSR. For example, in Business 
and Society:  Developing Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK, the DTI 
presents twelve case studies to demonstrate the ‘business case for CSR’. These 
case studies are: 
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  A supermarket scheme entitled ‘Stores in the Community’ aimed at 
developing good community relations 
  A hotel and restaurant that purchases local produce, employs local people 
and saves resources through recycling and monitoring water and power use 
  A DIY chain that has educated foreign suppliers to adopt safer and fairer 
practices 
  An energy retailer providing a fixed payment scheme for pensioners  
  A printing company that has invested in new technology to improve 
efficiency and reduce pollution 
  A travel company offering a specialised service for blind and partially-
sighted people 
  A telecommunications company with a programme of school visits designed 
to improve young people’s communication skills 
  A television retailer that has funded community projects 
  A construction company providing training programmes for local people 
from disadvantaged backgrounds 
  A box manufacturing company that has developed close ties with local 
schools 
  A multinational manufacturer of food, home and personal care products that 
has developed a strong system of global reporting on environmental 
performance which has helped to reduce waste and emissions 
  An electronics manufacturer organising and subsidising training at work and 
in the community. Only this last case study can be said to be a case study on 
the internal dimension of CSR. 
 
This suggests that while the EU has made clear it conceives of CSR as including 
employee relations and working conditions, the UK Government needs to 
communicate the message much more clearly if it is really serious about the 
interrelationship of CSR and working time.  
 
 
5.4  Wider scepticism towards CSR  
 
The interview evidence indicates that, for some, corporate social responsibility is 
still in the very early stages of evolution in the business community. The 
Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) stated that, ‘not many people are into 
CSR so far’ and the CIPD believed that ‘most people do not use the term CSR.’ 
AMICUS also argued that CSR is ‘a myth.’    33
 
Some of the interviewees expressed the view that it was difficult to say whether 
working time was an aspect of the CSR agenda because as yet there is no clear 
definition of what the CSR agenda incorporated. For example, the CBI respondent 
argued that, 
 
‘There are problems around this term…you know corporate social 
responsibility has come on to the agenda in the last few years and I think as 
yet people and policy makers are still groping around to see what it covers. 
For a lot of people it is about relations with the developing world, for others it 
incorporates issues nearer to home. I think it depends on how you define 
corporate social responsibility. I think a lot more work needs to go into that.’ 
 
Engineering company ME1 also believed there was uncertainty about what was 
incorporated under the CSR umbrella.  
 
‘CSR has not been defined yet, guidelines and regulations have not been laid 
down, for anybody. There are lots of consultants making a fortune about 
telling everyone what they think. We are taking the view that when we know 
what it is we are supposed to be corporately responsible for we will do it.’ 
 
In addition, the evidence suggested there is a relationship between the degree of 
cognisance of corporate social responsibility and the size of companies, with 
smaller companies being more concerned with surviving as a business rather than 
embracing concepts such as CSR. For example, the TGWU expressed the 
following opinion: 
 
‘I think [CSR] is almost a function of size. The larger companies are 
conscious of CSR for image reasons. They do not like bad publicity. While 
very small companies, which are almost at the margins of survival, are not 
interested in CSR. They are only interested in survival. So, CSR is a function 
of size.’ 
 
The EEF were also of the opinion that smaller companies had very little 
cognisance of corporate social responsibility: 
 
‘If you were to go and ask your average ABC Metalcraft in the West 
Midlands what corporate social responsibility means they would give you a   34
very old fashioned look. Big companies are aware of the need to be seen as a 
good employer but for ABC Metalcraft I think they would just wonder what 
you are on about.’ 
 
ACAS also posited that, ‘at [one] end of the spectrum there are employers who are 
just trying to survive… and therefore things like working time [and CSR] are not 
exactly peripheral but [those companies] do not have the same awareness of their 
impact.’ 
 
This anecdotal evidence was to a large extent borne out by the case studies of the 
two smaller engineering companies. For example, ME1, an engineering company 
with 150 employees, believed that corporate social responsibility is ‘just another 
burden on the employer’. Similarly, ME3, with 350 employees stated that ‘CSR is 
something that we have not considered’.  ME2 said they always tried to treat their 
420 employees fairly, but the company had little cognisance of CSR: ‘We do not 
have a CSR policy as such…. We are just trying to operate within the law within 
the constraints that we have… at the end of the day we are in manufacturing and 
there is not a lot of spare money, things are very tight… I am not sure where 
corporate social responsibility goes. We just do our best’. 
 
However, there was also evidence to suggest that it is not only small companies on 
the brink of survival that have little or no cognisance of corporate social 
responsibility.  For example, FL2, a large, European-owned, investment bank, said 
that ‘as an organisation we have not given this subject any formal consideration as 
yet… as a company we have not formally considered the implications of CSR or 
work-life balance.’ 
 
Furthermore, there was also anecdotal evidence indicating that even where the 
business system was aware of CSR, this did not translate into a substantive change 
in operational terms. For example, one of the respondents from the TUC was very 
sceptical as to the operative substance of CSR in the majority of cases:  
 
‘I try and avoid using the rhetoric of CSR because I do not like it…There are 
some employers that take it seriously… But, I think a lot of it is just an 
attempt by companies to avoid reputational risk or to maintain what they see 
as the integrity of their brand very often through adopting nice window-
dressing.’  
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The personnel director of ME3 was similarly sceptical about the adoption of 
corporate social responsibility policies by larger employers. 
 
‘I am a little bit cynical in some ways. We get involved with companies like 
[supermarket XYZ plc] for example. [XYZ plc] are great at waving the flag 
with regard to their involvement with their employees and blending the whole 
work-life balance correctly and having a social responsibility within the 
society and all of these things. Regretfully if you peel away the layers of that 





In this paper we have contrasted the recent public discourse of EU and UK 
institutions concerning CSR and labour standards with an empirical study of the 
implementation, over the same period, of the Working Time Directive in the UK.  
The evidence suggests that the high hopes invested in reflexive law in general and 
the ‘new CSR’ in particular as a mode of regulation have not so far been borne out 
by the experience of the implementation of the WTD.  Thanks to the wide 
derogations contained in the Directive and the parallel UK regulations, the new 
statutory limits on working time have been easily avoided in many workplaces.  
Little has been done to shift the predominant culture of long-hours working.  This 
is despite recognition, on the part of at least some of the actors concerned, that 
extended working and reliance upon overtime result in sub-optimal utilisation of 
labour.  But many employers are simply unwilling to visualise the WTD as an 
instrument for improving efficiency, and instead see it as an instance of external 
governmental interference which should be resisted on the grounds of flexibility.  
The ‘new CSR’ has done little or nothing to help shift perceptions.  While some 
respondents did see working time as an issue with CSR implications, in particular 
where it was linked to health and safety and work-life balance concerns, there was 
also widespread reluctance to see CSR as touching upon ‘internal’ issues of 
employment relations.  We also encountered deep scepticism on the part of certain 
respondents who saw corporate use of CSR as ‘window dressing’. 
 
While it be would premature to rule out the use of corporate governance 
mechanisms, including shareholder activism, as a means of advancing a more 
progressive approach to HRM, it would be equally unwise to assume that adequate 
conditions currently exist in the UK context for CSR to play the role intended for   36
it.  In addition to the considerable barriers which exist in terms of information 
asymmetries on the shareholder side of the equation (see Armour, Deakin and 
Konzelmann, 2003), the present study has highlighted significant blockages in the 
transmission of a CSR agenda to the arena of employment relations.  For the 
majority of UK employers and employers’ organisations, the conduct of HRM is 
an issue for managerial prerogative, on which ‘soft law’ and corporate governance 
mechanisms barely impinge.  Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that 
trade unions have difficulty in convincing their own members to accept the 
complex trade-offs involved in moving away from reliance on overtime to 
supplement basic earnings.   
 
A generation ago, in his study of the Fawley productivity agreements, Allan 
Flanders wrote of the systematic use of overtime in British industry that its 
‘fatalistic acceptance was symptomatic of management’s casual attitude towards 
the use of human resources’ (Flanders, 1964: 223).  Forty years on, it would seem 
that little has changed. 
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